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  During the past few years, there have been growing interests among researchers to study the 
effect of block share ownership on corporate earning especially in developing countries. The 
purpose of this paper is to consider the impact of block ownership on performance of firms in 
terms of profitability. The proposed study develops two econometric models and applies them 
on selected firms from Tehran Stock Exchange over the period 2002-2010. The primary 
objective of this survey is to find the relationship between return of assets and Tobin's Q as 
dependent variables with eight independent variables including company size, sales growth, 
block ownership, debt and liability ratios, etc. The results of implementation of ordinary least 
squares on two econometric models reveal that while there is no meaningful relationship 
between return of asset and block ownership there is a meaningful relationship between block 
ownership and Tobin's Q. 
© 2013 Growing Science Ltd.  All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction 
During the past few years, there have been growing interests among researchers to study the effect of 
block share ownership on corporate earning especially in developing countries. King and Santor 
(2008) examined how family ownership impacts the performance and capital structure of 613 
Canadian firms over the period 1998- 2005. They distinguished the impact of family ownership from 
the use of control-enhancing mechanisms and reported that freestanding family owned firms with a 
single share class had similar market performance than other firms based on Tobin’s q ratios, superior 
accounting performance based on ROA, and higher financial leverage based on debt-to-total assets. 
However, family owned firms, which implement dual-class shares had valuations, which were lower 
by 17% on average compared with widely held firms, despite having similar ROA and financial 
leverage. Andres (2008) examined the relationship between founding-family ownership and firm 
performance by applying panel information on 275 German exchange-listed firms. He showed that 
family firms were not only more profitable than widely-held firms but also outperform firms with   130
other kinds of blockholders by separating the family impact from general blockholder impacts. 
Nevertheless, the performance of family businesses was only better in firms where the founding-
family was still active either on the executive or on the supervisory board. They recommended that 
family ownership was associated with superior firm performance only under certain circumstances. If 
families were just large shareholders without board representation, the performance of their 
companies would not distinguishable from other firms. The results also indicated that other 
blockholders either influenced firm performance adversely or had no detectable influence on 
performance measures. 
Kim and Lu (2011) investigated the relationship between CEO ownership and firm valuation hinges 
critically on the strength of external governance (EG). The relationship was hump-shaped when EG 
was weak, but was insignificant when EG was strong. The results implied that CEO ownership and 
EG were substitutes for mitigating agency problems when ownership was low. However, very high 
levels of share ownership could reduce firm value by entrenching the CEO and discouraging him 
from taking risk, unless mitigated by strong EG. They identified channels through which CEO 
ownership affected firm value by examining R&D, which was discretionary and risky. They found 
CEO ownership similarly exhibited a hump-shaped relationship with R&D when EG was weak, but 
no relationship when EG was strong.  
Jeon et al. (2011) studied the relationship between foreign ownership and the decisions on payout 
policy in the Korean stock market. They reported that foreign investors demonstrate a preference for 
firms that pay high dividends. The results were driven by the fact that most of the foreign investors in 
the Korean market were institutional investors and thus had both dividend clienteles and monitoring 
incentives. However, foreign investors neither expressed preference for firms that buy back shares, 
nor were they related to encouraging firms to increase repurchases. They reported little evidence that 
domestic institutions had a significant impact on payout policy. 
Chen et al. (2012) investigated the effect of insider managerial ownership on financial performance of 
publicly traded tourist hotels in Taiwan. Insider managerial shareholding (IMS) incorporated two 
various classes of owners including managers and directors. The indicators of financial performance 
under consideration were return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), stock return (SR), and 
Tobin's Q. In addition to analyze total insider managerial ownership (IMS), the study splited IMS into 
two components (MAS and DIRS) and examined each of them, separately. Subsequently, panel 
regression tests investigated the impacts of IMS, MAS, and DIRS on financial performance of 
Taiwanese tourist hotels. Test results recommended that IMS explained ROA, ROE and Tobin's Q, 
but not SR. Further, compared to MAS, DIRS had a more significant effect on hotel performance. 
Bennedsen and Meisner Nielsen (2010) reported that there was a higher value discount in family 
firms, in firms with low cash flow concentration, and in industries with higher amenity value. 
Barry et al. (2011) analyzed the link between ownership structure and risk in both privately owned 
and publicly held banks. They considered five categories of shareholders, which were specific to their 
dataset and reported that ownership structure was significant in explaining risk differences but mainly 
for privately owned banks. Lin et al. (2009) provided some new insights to the debate regarding the 
merits of bank equity ownership of companies and emphasized how banking and corporate finance 
behaved differently in emerging markets due to their unique institutional background. 
2. The proposed study 
The proposed study of this paper uses the historical information of stocks traded on Tehran Stock 
Exchange over the period 2002-2010. In our survey, we consider four major criteria for picking the 
stocks, which are as follows, 
1.  Firm must be tradable before year 2002 and it must have been actively traded during the years 
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2.  Firm should not have changed their fiscal year during the period of study. 
3.  No holding or investment companies are permitted in this survey. 
4.  All necessary information must be available.   
 
Based on these criteria, we could determine 142 firms for the proposed study of this research and 
using 1278 year-firm from 24 different industries, the proposed study of this paper considers the 
following two hypotheses, 
 
1.  There is a meaningful relationship between return of assets and block ownership status.  
2.  There is a meaningful relationship between Tobin's Q and block ownership.  
2.1 Dependent variable  
2.1.1 Return of assets 
Return of assets (ROA) is the first variable of this work and it is computed as follows, 
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where EBTi,t is the earning before tax and Asseti,t is total book value of all assets associated with firm 
i at time t.  
2.1.2 QTobin 
This ratio measures the performance of firms based on Q Tobin, 
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where S_MVi,t is market value of firm i at time t, STD_BVi,t is the book value of short term debts of 
firm i at time t, LTD_BVi,t is the book value of long term liabilities of firm i at time t and finally 
TA_BVi,t is total asset book value of firm i at time t. 
2.2. Independent variables 
2.2.1 Block owners (LBOWNi,t) 
This variable represents the ownership of small number of shareholders who own big portions of 
shares. The primary objective of these shareholders is to have, at least, one member in board of 
directors and in Tehran Stock Exchange, this ratio is calculated as follows, 
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where N is total number of outstanding shares, B is total number of members of board of directors 
and BS determines the number of seats. 
2.3. Control variables 
2.3.1 The number of board of directors (BDSIZEi,t) 
This variable determines the number of seats in board of directors in a firm.  
2.3.2. Debt ratio (DRi,t)   
This is the ratio of total liabilities (TotalDebit) on total assets (TotalAsset) and shows what portion of 
financing is provided through borrowing money from banks or other financial institutions.   132
t i
t i
t i TotalAsset
TotalDebit
DR
,
,
,  . 
(4)   
2.3.3. Liquidity ratio (LIQi,t) 
This is the ratio of total current assets (Cuttent_Assets) on total current liabilities 
(Current_Liabilities) as follows, 
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2.3.4  Age (AGEi,t) 
This ratio is calculated by taking the natural logarithm of a firm from the year it started its business 
activities.  
2.3.5. Size (SIZEi,t) 
This variable is computed by taking natural logarithm of market cap. 
2.3.6. Growth (GROWTHi,t)  
This ratio shows the relative growth of firm's sale i at time t and it is calculated as follows, 
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2.3.7. Risk (RISKi,t)  
Risk of a firm (RISKi,t) is calculated as the standard deviation of the monthly return of firms during 
the fiscal year.  
2.4. Data gathering 
The proposed study of this paper gathers the necessary information from Tehran Stock Exchange and 
the regression analysis have been performed using Eviews and SPSS software packages.  
2.5. The proposed models 
The proposed study of this paper uses two econometrics models as follows, 
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3. The results 
Table 1 shows details of statistical observations for the proposed study of this paper.  
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Table 1 
Statistical observations 
Variable Number  of 
observations 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Lowest 
value 
Highest 
value 
Skewness  
ROA  1277  0.1536  0.1565  -0.3097  0.8111  1.009  4.739 
QTOBIN 1277  1.6024  1.1788  0.2333  11.8044  4.163  25.149 
LBOWN  1277  56.272  24.981  0.0000  99.513  0.637  2.996 
BDSIZE 1277  5.068  0.3395  3  7  4.017  23.982 
DR  1277  0.6735  0.1758  0.0000  1.9011  0.429  6.514 
LIQ 1277  1.1888  0.5257  0.0000  6.4713  3.131  23.420 
AGE  1277  3.5058  0.3507  1.3862  4.0604  -1.211  5.196 
SIZE 1277 12.4708  1.5300  8.4319  17.2060  0.693 3.038 
GROWTH  1277  0.2016  0.5264  -1.0000  9.4684  9.014  130.657 
RISK 1277  2.3458  1.0081  -4.2381  5.6879  -1.072  6.778 
Table 2 shows details of the implementation of ordinary least square for Eq. (7) 
Table 2 
The results of regression model 
   Coefficient  t-student P-value  Result 
Intercept  α  0.0961  8.180  0.0000  Positive 
LBOWN  β1 -0.0001  -0.725  0.4682  Not  significant 
BDSIZE  β2  0.0017  0.2852  0.7755  Not significant 
DR  β3 -0.2155  -9.358  0.0000  Negative 
LIO  β4  0.0334  4.972  0.0000  Positive 
AGE  β5 -0.3548  -12.620  0.0000  Negative 
SIZE  β6  0.0424  11.833  0.0000  Positive 
GROWTH  β7 0.0343  9.649  0.0000  Positive 
RISK  β8  -0.0011  -0.7593  0.4478  Not significance 
AR(1)  0.3961  14.200  0.0000  Positive 
In addition, Table 3 shows details of implementation of various statistical tests on the first model. 
Table 3 
Statistical tests for the first model 
Ramsey Durbin-Watson Breusch-Pagan  Jarque-Bera
F  P-value  D  F  P-value  Chi-Square  P-value 
0.2098 0.6469  1.98  5.407  0.0000 1.033  0.5963 
  
As we can observe from the results of Table 3, Durbin=Watson ratio is calculated as 1.98, which 
means there is no correlation between residuals. Based on the results of Table 2, we can conclude that 
there is not any meaningful relationship between return of assets and block ownership and the first 
hypothesis of this paper is rejected when the level of significance is five percent.  Table 4 shows 
details of the implementation of ordinary least square for Eq. (8). 
 
Table 4 
The results of regression model 
   Coefficient  t-student P-value  Result 
Intercept  α  -6.6164  -5.830  0.0000  Negative 
LBOWN  β1 0.0015  2.348 0.0190  Positive 
BDSIZE  β2  0.0076  0.2846  0.7760  Not significant 
DR  β3 1.1767  12.691  0.0000  Positive 
LIO  β4  -0.0212  -0.919  0.3580  Not significant 
AGE  β5 -2.0281  -6.576 0.0000  Negative 
SIZE  β6  1.0103  68.933  0.0000  Positive 
GROWTH  β7 -0.0195  -2.082 0.0375  Negative 
RISK  β8  -0.0007  -0.131  0.8954  Not significance 
AR(1)   0.6915  35.691  0.0000 Positive   134
In addition, Table 5 shows details of implementation of various statistical test to verify the first 
model. 
 
Table 5 
Statistical tests for the first model 
Ramsey Durbin-Watson  Breusch-Pagan  Jarque-Bera 
F  P-value  D  F  P-value  Chi-Square  P-value 
3.527 0.0606  2.04  7.728 0.0000  2.1524  0.3408 
  
As we can observe from the results of Table 6, Durbin=Watson ratio is calculated as 2.04, which 
means there is no correlation between residuals. Based on the results of Table 4, we can conclude that 
there is a meaningful relationship between Tobin' Q and block ownership and the first hypothesis of 
this paper is confirmed when the level of significance is five percent. In other word, an increase of 
one percent on block ownership will yield 0.0015 unit increase in Tobin's Q.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have presented an empirical study to find the relationship between return of assets 
and Tobin's Q as dependent variables with eight independent variables including company size, sales 
growth, block ownership, debt and liability ratios, etc. The results of implementation of ordinary least 
squares on two econometric models have disclosed that while there was no meaningful relationship 
between return of asset and block ownership there was a meaningful and positive relationship 
between block ownership and Tobin's Q.   
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